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Review Essay 
On the Limits of Court-ordered Social Change: 
A Critical Look at Dimond's Beyond Busing 
Neal E. Devins 
PAUL R. DIMOND, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segrega-
tion. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985. Pp. xii+411. 
$29.95. 
One central inquiry underlies all race discrimination cases-namely, 
what would the world look like in the absence of illegal discrimination? If 
the world were naturally integrated, statistical imbalance would serve as 
proof of discrimination. Moreover, in such a world, expansive race-con-
scious remedies should be used to ensure "natural" racial balance. If the 
world, absent illegal discrimination, were racially imbalanced, however, re-
liance on such statistical measures would be inappropriate. In such a 
world, proof of discrimination must hinge on evidence that suggests the 
existence of some discriminatory animus. Correlative to this, judicial reme-
dies in a racially imbalanced world should seek only to redress the conse-
quences of proven discrimination. 
In school desegregation cases, the Supreme Court-by using contradic-
tory evidentiary presumptions and principles of law-has vacillated be-
tween the two models. 1 Social scientists too have reached conflicting 
conclusions on this matter.2 Finally, the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan 
Neal E. Devins is assistant general counsel at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; beginning in 
summer 1987, he will be assistant professor of law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary. B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. The views expressed 
are those of the author. 
1. Supporting the naturally integrated model are Court holdings which suggest that black-white 
student population ratios measure the adequacy of a school desegregation plan, Green v. County School 
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and Court decisions which have found that intentional discrimination in one 
portion of a school district creates a presumption that there may be purposeful discrimination in other 
portions ofthe school district, Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Supporting the possibly 
segregated model are Court holdings that demand proof of intentional discrimination even if racial 
imbalance is the natural and foreseeable consequence of school board action, Austin Indep. School Dist. 
v. U.S., 419 (1976) (mem.), and Court rulings that limit desegregation remedies to the demonstrable 
incremental effect of specified discriminatory conduct, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 
433 u.s. 406 (1977). 
2. With respect to housing, some social scientists argue that "socioeconomic differentials do not 
account for residential segregation; discrimination by agents in the housing market ... as well as gov-
ernment regulations .. . are likely contributors." Streitweisser & Goodman, A Survey of Recent Re-
search on Race and Residential Location, 2 Population Research & Pol'y Rev. 253, 265 (1983). Other 
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administrations have each approached this issue differently.3 Sharp con-
trasts within judicial reasoning, social science research, and partisan politics 
make unlikely the attainment of consensus on the vexing and fundamental 
problem of which of the two models should shape decision making in this 
area. Yet, like other divisive matters, the desegregation issue gives rise to 
important books that advocate one of these world visions. 
Paul Dimond's Beyond Busing,4 a fascinating first-hand account of 1970s 
northern school desegregation decisions, provides another worthwhile per-
spective on this question. 5 By focusing on the personal experiences of civil 
rights lawyers and their witnesses, Dimond provides a "human perspective" 
to support his conclusion that blacks are victimized by pervasive "caste" 
discrimination. For Dimond, caste discrimination involves the contain-
ment of the minority community by the dominant white culture through 
various economic and social customs. To eradicate such discrimination, 
Dimond argues, judicial remedies must right the social condition thrust 
upon minority America. Specifically, Dimond asserts that courts should 
not limit their focus to the incremental effects of specific discriminatory 
acts. Instead, courts must recognize that racial isolation is the by-product 
of numerous contributing factors, ranging from social customs to inten-
tional discrimination. 
This argument certainly is provocative, but it is not persuasive. In my 
view, Dimond's understanding of the causes of racial imbalance and the 
scope of judicial authority is too simplistic. Furthermore, his notion of per-
vasive caste discrimination is greatly exaggerated. The world cannot be 
viewed in such absolutist terms. I do not doubt that discrimination has 
impeded the progess ofblack people. But Dimond goes too far in using the 
collective sins of a dominant white culture as an escape hatch for the 
problems of blacks. Numerous factors-including but not limited to dis-
crimination-explain racial separation. 
social scientists, however, conclude that the migration of whites from city to suburb is not a result of 
racial concerns but of lower tax rates, lower per capita school expenditures, and expanded employment 
opportunities. See id. at 262. See also Hearings on School Desegregation Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1981)(testi-
mony of Gary Orfield). Another pertinent issue on which social scientists differ is the degree of white 
resistance to expansive school desegregation orders. Suggesting that the world i!. naturally integrated, 
some social science research indicates that comprehensive metropolitanwide desegregation remedies ul-
timately lead to decreases in white flight/residential segregation. See id. at 161 (statement of Gary 
Orfield). In contrast, suggesting that the world is possibly segregated, some social science research 
attributes white flight and social segregation to mandatory pupil transportation remedies. See id at 
205-12 (statement of David Armor). 
3. See generally Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago 
School Desegregation Cases, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1243 (1984). 
4. Although principally concerned with school desegregation litigation, Dimond devotes some at-
tention to housing segregation cases (at 183-225). Since Dimond interweaves the issue of housing dis-
crimination with his discussion of school desegregation, this essay will view the housing question as a 
subset of school desegregation. 
5. See also D. Kirp. Just Schools (1982); J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke (1979). 
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Dimond's recommendations regarding appropriate judicial action are 
also troublesome. Although I concur with many of his criticisms of 
Supreme Court school desegregation cases, I do not think that the Court 
should abandon traditional judicial restraint in order to become a social 
crusader. Unlike legislative hearings designed to ascertain the underlying 
causes of a range of social problems, the judicial inquiry is more narrowly 
defined. School desegregation cases, therefore, do not provide the appropri-
ate forum to explore personal prejudice and social customs. In fact, unless 
prohibited by the Constitution or statutory law, certain forms of discrimi-
natory conduct are not subject to judicial review. Furthermore, since Di-
mond's model would permit a black plaintiff to extend a discrimination 
lawsuit beyond traditional notions of injury to the pervasive web of discrim-
ination that characterizes urban America, courts would be forced to aban-
don such article III justiciability requirements as injury in fact and 
redressability. Aside from being mandated by our system of separation of 
powers, these justiciability requirements make practical sense. Courts may 
not have the institutional capability to implement far-reaching social 
reform. 
Dimond, finally, fails to consider the fundamental importance of the pri-
vate marketplace and individual choice. In his eagerness to argue that caste 
discrimination is a meritorious egalitarian concept, he ignores other values 
fundamental to American policy that might counter his views. 
I. Dimond's Assessment of Race Relations and the Courts 
Beyond Busing is not concerned with the success or failure of pupil trans-
portation remedies. Instead, by looking at the human side of 1970s school 
desegregation cases, Dimond seeks to understand whether America is still 
divided by a color line. He focuses on the school desegregation cases be-
cause "a primary goal of [these] cases of the 1970s has been to raise the 
issue whether a form of apartheid splits much of metropolitan America on a 
racial basis" (at vi). The cases that Dimond refers to are Milliken v. Brad-
ley in Detroit, 6 Dayton v. Brinkman, 7 Columbus School Board v. Penick, 8 
and Evans v. Buchanan in Delaware. 9 
In these cases, Dimond feels that civil rights attorneys (such as himself)10 
endeavored to have courts come to terms with the underlying causes of 
societal discrimination. During the course of these trials, personal accounts 
of segregative treatment were presented by prominent members of the black 
community (at 50-54); maps were drawn demonstrating that discrimina-
tory housing practices forced blacks into the inner city (at 39-40); black 
6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); discussed in Dimond, at 21-118. 
7. Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 406 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 
(1977). These cases are discussed in Dimond at 121-80, 343-94. 
8. 443 U.S. 449 (1979); discussed in Dimond at 229-79, 343-94. 
9. 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978)(en bane), cert. denied, 46 U.S. 
923 (1980); discussed in Dimond at 283-339. 
10. Dimond served as co-counsel to plaintiffs in these school desegregation cases. 
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teachers and school administrators recounted efforts by their school dis-
tricts (or city governments) to keep white and black students separate and 
to deny resources to black students that were provided to whites (at 3-17); 
and sociologists and educators-serving as expert witnesses-argued that 
discrimination was the most likely explanation for government conduct that 
perpetuated racial isolation (at 37-38). 
Through the introduction of such evidence, civil rights attorneys sought 
to accomplish two related tasks. First, by showing that the school district 
had been actively involved in creating and maintaining a dual school sys-
tem, these attorneys wished to show that a systemwide desegregation plan 
with mandatory components was needed to ensure equal education oppor-
tunity to black school children. Second, by introducing evidence of perva-
sive "caste" discrimination, these attorneys hoped that school desegregation 
cases would extend to housing and other discriminatory practices within 
the district and would extend beyond the school district to the entire metro-
politan community. Dimond argues that this bifurcated approach was a 
practical necessity: 
For a plain justice of the peace concerned about basic fairness, it might be 
enough to argue that school authorities may not incorporate the larger com-
munity's discriminatory system of racial containment into the schools. But 
we intended to show more, that school authorities also manipulated their 
neighborhood zoning policy to fuel the system of racial ghettoization. That 
was the only way to secure our position [in the courts]. (At 56) 
From plaintiffs' perspective, the results of this approach were mixed. At-
torneys were unable to broaden the judicial inquiry beyond school district 
conduct and school district boundaries. Systemwide relief, however, was 
ultimately ordered in Dayton, Columbus, and Detroit, and interdistrict re-
lief was mandated in Delaware. 
* * * 
Dimond's perceptions are best expressed in his analysis of the Detroit case, 
Milliken v. Bradley. In Milliken, the plaintiffs' attorneys convinced District 
Court Judge Stephen Roth both that school desegregation was an attribute 
of pervasive community discrimination and that-due to the containment 
of blacks in the inner city-an effective school desegregation remedy must 
extend beyond school district boundaries to the entire metropolitan area.11 
Making these findings, Judge Roth ordered Detroit and its suburbs to for-
mulate a mammoth interdistrict desegregation plan. 
11. The district court found: "Residential segregation within the city and throughout the larger 
metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long-standing . ... While the racially unrestricted 
choice of black persons and economic factors may have played some part in the development of this 
pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and customs 
of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do restrict the housing [and educa-
tional] opportunities of black people" (quoted at 399). 
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This decision, in Dimond's view, exemplifies the ability of an open-
minded judiciary to address pervasive "caste" discrimination. According to 
Dimond: 
Judge Roth came to know the color line of racial ghettoization in his own 
state: he found that an interlocking web of public, community, and private 
discrimination contributed to the containment of black families and children 
in segregated housing and schools separate from whites-only housing and 
schools. He . . . determined that school segregation must be declared uncon-
stitutional so that all people would finally come to grips with the continuing 
color line in American life. (At 73) 
Dimond finds this determination especially significant since, at the start of 
the case, Judge Roth was unsympathetic toward minority claims. In other 
words, Dimond feels that this "dramatic conversion" in Judge Roth dem-
onstrates the strength of civil rights attorneys' proof of pervasive "caste" 
discrimination. 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this comprehensive approach and 
held that without proof of intentional discrimination in Detroit's surround-
ing suburbs, school desegregation remedies are limited to a school system's 
geographic boundaries. In so ruling, the Court insisted on such "legal for-
malisms" as the rules that only perpetuators of intentional discrimination 
are subject to desegregation obligations and that the scope of the violation 
defines the scope of the remedy. 
Criticizing this decision, Dimond claims that "the Court's view of the 
nature of the violation did not even begin to address the state's responsibil-
ity for the wrong of containment, the color line of racial ghettoization and 
whites-only protection in metropolitan Detroit" (at 112-13). Especially 
irritating to Dimond was the Court's failure to consider evidence of metro-
politanwide housing discrimination;12 evidence that might have established 
a nexus between overwhelmingly black inner-city public schools and over-
whelmingly white suburban schools.13 
Dimond argues that the Court must address the basic question of 
whether "racial separation in America [is] a legacy and an engine of caste 
discrimination, or . . . a matter of voluntary choice and ethnic diversity" 
(at 399). Dimond thus is highly critical of Supreme Court decisions, like 
Milliken, where fundamental questions regarding the underlying causes of 
segregation are eschewed by the Court.14 To him, by not addressing these 
12. The Court claimed that it could not resolve this issue since it had not been considered by the 
appellate court. But, as Jay Wilkinson recognized: "In failing to remand to [the] district court for 
findings on past housing practices or even to explain their relevance, the Supreme Court failed to ad-
dress the foremost cause of metropolitan segregation." J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke 223-24 
(1979). 
13. Several instances were cited where discriminatory housing practices combined with a neighbor-
hood school policy ""naturally, probably, and foreseeably' resulted in segregation in the face of available 
desegregation alternatives" (at 62). 
14. Dimond's depiction of other cases likewise reflects his perception that courts should undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of the condition of racial separation. In the Dayton case, Dimond lambastes 
District Judge Carl Rubin for failing to consider evidence of discrimination in public housing. Alterna-
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fundamental questions, the "justices sought to absolve white America from 
responsibility for the ghetto" (at 396). Criticizing the Supreme Court's use 
of "legal formalisms" to frame school desegregation and other civil rights 
cases, he argues: 
We are not well served by a Court that whitewashes claims of violation, ar-
gues that the judiciary ought not hear claims of general social injustice unless 
specific judicially manageable remedies running against particular wrongdo-
ers are apparent, is so concerned about the extent of effective remedies that 
rationalizations of wrong as innocent conditions overwhelm, or order sweep-
ing remedies on the narrowest judicial prescription that particular wrongs 
require specific remedies. (At 400) 
In pleading that the Court rethink its compartmentalized approaches to 
segregation, Dimond would have the judiciary serve a quasi-legislative fact-
finding role. Each instance of discrimination would be the tip of an iceberg 
of purposeful caste discrimination. Under this approach, school desegrega-
tion cases would become general desegregation cases, involving the judici-
ary in related inquiries of discrimination in housing, employment, etc. 
Furthermore, in Dimond's model, judicial remedies would extend beyond 
school districts to municipalities and beyond education policy to housing 
and employment. In other words, the courts would take on a quasi-execu-
tive role in ensuring that government practices do not perpetuate caste 
discrimination. 
II. Analysis of Dimond's Theory 
Beyond Busing strongly supports the view that housing and school segre-
gation may be part of an "interlocking web" of discriminatory conduct. On 
this count, I do not take issue with Dimond; in fact, when limited to this 
question, few individuals would argue with him. 15 
Dimond, however, goes well beyond this proposition, arguing that all ra-
cial imbalance is a by-product of pervasive caste discrimination. In my 
view, this suggestion is fundamentally flawed. Contrary to Dimond's per-
ception of America's "contemporary, albeit substantially sanitized, form of 
tively, District Judge Robert Duncan's Columbus ruling is applauded for its recognition that the "inter-
action of housing and the schools operates to promote segregation in each" (at 251). Finally, in the 
Delaware case, Dimond refers to the interdistrict remedy as "complete, effective, and equitable relief 
from the continuing color line in schooling" (at 334). 
15. That school and housing discrimination may feed into each other is undeniable; neighborhood 
schools often reflect the racial composition of the surrounding residential area. Furthermore, although 
few court cases have explored the relationship of racial discrimination in education and housing, there 
are numerous decisions concerning discrimination in either housing or education. With respect to hous-
ing, before the mid-1960s, government condoned (and even encouraged) purposeful racial segregation in 
publicly assisted housing. See A. Hirsch, The Causes of Residential Segregation: A Historical Perspec-
tive (paper prepared for U.S. Commission on Civil Rights consultation/hearing on fair housing, Oct. 24, 
1985). Since the enactment of fair housing legislation in 1968, numerous municipalities have been sub-
jected to court orders for purposeful discrimination against minorities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1982). 
See, e.g., United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981). With respect to state-sponsored 
school segregation, numerous school systems throughout the nation have been found guilty of violating 
Brown v. Board of Education. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 5. 
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apartheid" (at 400), racial segregation is caused by a number of factors. 
Furthermore, in suggesting that the federal judiciary confront pervasive 
caste discrimination, Dimond does not heed express constitutional limits on 
the remedial authority of article III courts, nor does he consider practical 
limits on such court authority. Finally, Dimond fails to take into account 
such fundamental American values as individual choice and the free 
marketplace. 
A. Causes of Segregation 
It is naive to suggest that caste discrimination is the sole cause of racial 
segregation. Voluntary and involuntary forces contribute to such separa-
tion. Recent housing studies suggest that "there is no reason to believe that 
the level of residential segregation observed between [blacks and whites] 
purely and simply reflects the totality of only one group's demands."16 For 
example, "middle- and upper-income blacks experience relatively little price 
discrimination in more affluent white areas." 17 Moreover, although whites 
will pay more than blacks to live in a predominantly white neighborhood, 18 
data suggest that most blacks and whites are willing to live in nonexclusive 
neighborhoods.I9 
Undoubtedly, the above findings are subject to question and criticism. 
But even Farley and other researchers who recognized that at one time, "a 
pervasive 'web of discrimination' prevent[ed] blacks from freely competing 
for housing," argue: 
The continued operation of a web of discrimination is based upon the suppo-
sition that there is a strong demand on the part of almost all whites for ra-
cially segregated neighborhoods. However, ... [w]hite attitudes have 
become progressively more liberal with regard to housing opportunities for 
blacks. Not only do whites endorse the ideal of residential integration, they 
have become much more willing to live in integrated neighborhoods 
themselves. 20 
Furthermore, on several occasions, urban white America has sought a con-
structive voluntary solution to racial separation. For example, in his study 
of race relations in the San Francisco metropolitan area, Kirp notes efforts 
by many predominantly white communities to address perceived black 
needs.21 This study, by highlighting the differences between communities in 
their efforts to eradicate racial injustice, indicates that it is inappropriate to 
16. Lieberson & Carter, A Model for Inferring the Voluntary and Involuntary Causes of Residential 
Segregation, 19 Demography 5ll, 524 (1982). 
17. Mieszkowski & Syron, Economics Explanations for Housing Segregation, New Eng. Econ. Rev., 
March-April, 1978, at 33, 39. Other researchers, however, have found evidence of discrimination 
against blacks in housing price differentials and housing search costs. See, e.g., R . Lake, The New 
Suburbanites: Race and Housing in the Suburbs 172-73, 201-3 (1981). 
18. Mieszkowski & Syron, supra note 17, at 35. 
19. Farley, Bianchi, & Colastano, Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit 
Case, 441 Annals 97 (1979). 
20. !d. at 101. 
21. Kirp, supra note 5. Kirp's study, however, also notes the hesitancy of some white communities 
to constructively address race relations. 
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make generalizations about white attitudes toward racial isolation.22 This 
perception strongly conflicts with Dimond's vision of judicially and politi-
cally condoned "apartheid" in urban America. 
The variance between Dimond's theory and much of the existing research 
is further revealed in studies of residential segregation in Detroit. In Trial 
and Error, her study of the Detroit case, Wolf concludes: "the trial process, 
to some extent through distortions, but mainly through omissions in the 
testimony, produced a picture of residential segregation that was gravely 
defective."23 In Wolf's view, rather than relying on norms of scientific in-
quiry and reporting, civil rights attorneys-by focusing on earlier govern-
mental complicity in housing discrimination and thus "arous[ing] the 
judge's sense of injustice"24-based their cases on proof that was emotional 
in nature. Also contradicting Dimond's analysis is Farley's 1979 study, 
which concluded that numerous factors contributed to residential segrega-
tion in Detroit. 2 5 
B. The Court's Role 
Dimond's perception that an interlocking system of private and public 
discrimination contains the black community and limits its opportunities is 
not readily transferrable into Anglo-American jurisprudence. Article III 
mandates that courts resolve discrete "cases or controversies." Under this 
system, a litigant must "show that he personally has suffered some actual or 
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defend-
ant."26 Consequently, a black plaintifi:-by virtue of being black-cannot 
challenge purported discrimination by various governmental and private 
entities. Dimond's recommendation that the judicial inquiry in discrimina-
tion cases be expansive and thorough gives short shrift to this constitutional 
demand. Under Dimond's model, all blacks would have ready access to the 
courts, for all blacks suffer injury from an interlocking web of discrimina-
tion that comes from the dominant white culture. 
Dimond's model, furthermore, fails to recognize that certain types of dis-
criminatory conduct are beyond the purview of the courts. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause, for example, does not extend to private entities.27 Of equal 
significance, our constitutional system, for the most part, grants each indi-
vidual the rights to choose whom to interact with: the First Amendment 
accords constitutional protection to groups-such as the Ku Klux Klan 
and Nazis-who engage in racially motivated conduct; parents are free to 
22. See Devins, Integration and Local Politics, 73 Pub. Interest 175 (1983). 
23. E. Wolf, Trial and Erro 26 (1981). 
24. Id. at 81. 
25. Farley, Bianchi, & Colastano, supra note 19. 
26. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). 
27. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
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send their children to racially isolated private schools;28 families are free to 
move from racially mixed neighborhoods to racially isolated ones. 
Federal courts may also lack the institutional capacity to uphold Di-
mond's anticaste principle. Courts often cannot fully implement expansive 
institutional reform decisions.29 And without the support of those affected 
by their rulings, some court holdings are honored more in the breach than 
in the observance. 30 
By looking at community responses to court-ordered busing, one can see 
that public consensus is needed for the successful implementation of court 
decisions.31 Charlotte-Mecklenburg, for example, has been quite successful 
implementing a mandatory busing plan because of support from pupils, par-
ents, and city leaders. 32 
At the other extreme, public opposition to busing has left Boston's public 
schools more segregated today than they were 14 years ago.33 As Alexan-
der Bickel noted: "no policy that a court can order, and a school board, a 
city or even the State has the capacity to put into effect, will in fact result in 
the foreseeable future in racially balanced public schools. Only a reordering 
of the environment ... might have an appreciable impact."34 By recom-
mending an ever-increasing judicial role to address pervasive caste discrimi-
nation, Dimond appears unconcerned with Bickel's words regarding public 
consensus. 
The above considerations do not eliminate the possibility of social reform 
through the law. Discrimination in employment, in land use, and in educa-
tion can be-and have been-limited through judicial action. Federal 
courts, however, lack the authority and ability to unilaterally reshape 
society. 
C. Fundamental Values 
Dimond views statistical disparities between blacks and whites as anath-
ema, necessitating expansive judicial remedies to root out presumptive caste 
28. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (recognizing right of parents to send their children to 
discriminatory private schools). 
29. See, e.g., D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (1977). Compare M. Rebel & A. Block, 
Educational Policymaking and the Courts: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism (1982). 
30. See, e.g., W. Muir, Prayer in Schools (1967) (assessing compliance problems with school prayer 
decisions). 
31. Despite Brown and a plethora of lawsuits filed in the wake of Brown, equal education opportu-
nity advanced slowly from 1954 to 1964. With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, great strides were made in the desegregation of southern 
systems. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 3, at 1245-58. This change came because these enactments 
authorized the executive to cut off newly expanded federal financial assistance to discriminatory school 
systems. Yet, once public opinion toward increasingly expansive desegregation decisions shifted, Con-
gress repealed specific desegregation-related programs, thereby hampering efforts to attain equal educa-
tion opportunity. See id. Moreover, the Reagan Justice Department is unwilling to pursue mandatory 
busing remedies. See Speech by William Bradford Reynolds Before the Delaware Bar Association, Feb. 
1982, at 9. 
32. See Daniels, In Defense of Busing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983 (Magazine), at 34. 
33. See Higgins, Boston's Busing Disaster, New Republic, Feb. 28, 1983, at 16. 
34. A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 132 (1970). 
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discrimination. Basing his theory exclusively on this brand of result-ori-
ented egalitarianism, Dimond apparently feels that values of pluralism and 
the economic marketplace should not be accorded any weight in a country 
that unjustifiably contains its urban black population. Dimond, moreover, 
seems uninterested in rights-oriented liberalism that "seeks a neutral legal 
framework which assures each individual an equal opportunity to pursue 
interests and goals as free moral agents."35 Instead, Dimond seems ob-
sessed with creating a judicial mechanism that will oversee all public and 
private conduct which affects blacks. 
This approach does not consider the rights of the individual. Although 
the Constitution's equal protection guarantee and antidiscrimination laws 
are sensible tools for stopping pernicious racial discrimination, individual 
accomplishments and individual rights must be acknowledged and pro-
tected. By equating statistical disparities with illegal discrimination, Di-
mond improperly ignores the role that the individual does and should play 
in our culture. 
Conclusion 
Beyond Busing aspires to make its readers "[confront] the issue raised by 
the segregation cases" (at vi). This purpose is accomplished, but with 
mixed results. Dimond's "human perspective" effectively demonstrates 
that school desegregation is but one element of the much more pervasive 
problem of racial separation. In this sense, Dimond places the school de-
segregation issue into a broader context (hence, the title Beyond Busing). 
Dimond's notion of caste discrimination is not credible, however. Many 
factors in addition to discrimination contribute to racial separation. Be-
cause he does not consider what role individual choice and personal wealth 
play in creating racial separation, Dimond's work appears simplistic. His 
criticisms of judicial decision making are similarly flawed. Constitutional 
and practical considerations foreclose both judicial findings of caste dis-
crimination and judicial remedies for such violations. 
Finally, I question the values that underlie Dimond's model. Egalitarian 
considerations support antidiscrimination laws and judicial relief for public 
and private conduct that unnecessarily displaces bla~k interests. But Amer-
ican policy is based both on egalitarian and pluralistic principles;36 neither 
of these competing values should displace the other. 
These weaknesses do not undercut the significance of Beyond Busing. Di-
mond forthrightly admits that his "book may offer a limited perspective 
because it portrays the apparent certitude of one side in the midst of a com-
plex, adversary struggle" (at 395). And when viewed as the work of an 
advocate, concerns regarding the accuracy of Dimond's theory of caste dis-
35. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1878, 
1881 (1984). 
36. See Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees, 32 Cath. U.L. Rev. 901 (1985). 
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crimination or his assessment of judicial decision making seem less signifi-
cant; the reader, instead, may view Dimond's work as the first-hand 
account of a social crusader. On this level, Dimond succeeds. His insights 
into the strategies and perspectives of civil rights attorneys are enlighten-
ing, as are his perceptions of adversary counsel and trial judges involved in 
1970s segregation cases. Also, although Dimond's fervent advocacy perme-
ates his description of trial court proceedings and his analysis of court rul-
ings, he is quite evenhanded in his explication of these substantive holdings. 
In short, although I found his conclusions of questionable merit, Professor 
Dimond's Beyond Busing is a valuable addition to the literature on this 
most important subject. 
